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Article
Wal-Mart Bank in Mexico:
Money to the Masses and the Home-Host Hole
ANNA GELPERN
In November 2006 Wal-Mart’s Mexican subsidiary received approval
to open a bank. The application faced little opposition in Mexico, unlike
the company’s failed effort to start a bank in the United States. This was
partly because in Mexico, Wal-Mart’s entry was generally regarded as
increasing competition in a historically concentrated banking sector. With
over three-quarters of all Mexicans unbanked, the authorities also looked
to Wal-Mart to reach the underserved. Along with the promise, WalMart’s entry presents a transnational regulatory dilemma with
implications beyond Wal-Mart and Mexico. Because it is Wal-Mart’s only
banking venture, the new institution will have its Mexican host as the sole
supervisor. The corporate headquarters in the United States will remain
unregulated at home and beyond Mexico’s reach. This “home-host hole”
is inevitable where supervisory harmonization proceeds against the
background of regulatory diversity: the United States has a policy against
combining banking and commerce; Mexico does not. The hole presents
risks for Mexico; however, this Article argues that patching the hole with
more centralization at the international level may come at Mexico’s
expense.
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Wal-Mart Bank in Mexico:
Money to the Masses and the Home-Host Hole
ANNA GELPERN∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2006, Wal-Mart applied for a banking license in Mexico.1
As with all news Wal-Mart, reactions in the United States broke into two
camps. Wall Street analysts hailed the brilliant move: consumer credit, the
chain’s natural niche in Mexico, is growing by over 30% a year.2 WalMart skeptics said the application was proof of its plans to add a banking
arm to its global empire and sneak a bank into the United States.3
A coalition of community bankers, consumer groups and labor
associations had previously blocked Wal-Mart’s attempts to start a bank in
the United States.4 In stark contrast, approval of Wal-Mart’s application in
∗
Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark. I am grateful to the organizers
and participants in Wal-Mart Matters, a University of Connecticut Law School symposium, for giving
me an opportunity to address this topic and support in developing it, to Philip G. Cerny, Sean Hagan,
Chris Kushlis, Fabrizio Lopez-Gallo, Leonardo Martinez, Patricia A. McCoy, John Pottow, Brad
Setser, Michele Shannon, D. Daniel Sokol, Daniel K. Tarullo, Matthew R. Tubin, Arthur E. Wilmarth,
and members of the International Trade and Investment Working Group at Rutgers-Newark for
comments and insights, to Dennis Kim-Prieto, Jeff Leung, Susan Lyons and Trina Sen for invaluable
research help, and to the Dean’s Research Fund at Rutgers-Newark for financial support. The errors
are all mine.
1
Joe Adler, Wal-Mart Discusses Branch Plan for Mexico, AM. BANKER, Aug. 4, 2006, available
at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File.
2
See Associated Press, Wal-Mart’s Mexican Unit Plans to Launch Bank, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 3,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14171601/ (quoting a Merrill Lynch analyst’s discussion of the
consumer benefits of Wal-Mart’s entry into the Mexican banking market); see also Marla Dickerson,
Wal-Mart is Counting on Banking, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, LAT File (quoting a Morgan Stanley analyst’s assessment that the Mexican banking market
represents a lucrative opportunity for Wal-Mart). See, e.g., José J. Sidaoui, The Mexican Financial
System: Reforms and Evolution, in BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE BANKING SYSTEM IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES: HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE? 277, 289 (2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap28.pdf (citing consumer credit growth at over 35% in real terms
during the preceding four years); Yolanda C. Courtines & Juan M. Partida, Mexican Banks 2Q06: Loan
Growth and Market Share Analysis (JPMorgan, Emerging Markets Equity Research), Sept. 21, 2006, at
3 (on file with Connecticut Law Review) (citing growth figures of 48% and 37% for 2005 and 2006,
respectively).
3
See Adler, supra note 1; Matthew Mogul, A Wal-Mart Bank? Yes—Sort of, KIPLINGER
FORECASTS, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.kiplingerforecasts.com/home/stories/a_wal_mart_bank__yes_
sort_of__.html; This Little Piggy Went to Wal-Mart, Bank Lawyer’s Blog, http://www.banklawyers
blog.com/3_bank_lawyers/2006/08/the_only_consta.html (Aug. 3, 2005 4:23am); Wal-Mart
Informative: Wal-Mart’s Mexico Unit Eyes Banking, http://www.my3cents.com/showReview.cgi?id=
15186 (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
4
For reports of opposition to Wal-Mart’s U.S. banking efforts, see, e.g., Steve Oberbeck,
Retailer, Grocer and Soon Bank of Wal-Mart, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 20, 2005, at E1, available at
LEXIS, News Library, SLTRIB File; Bernard Wysocki, Jr., On the Shelf: How Broad Coalition
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5

Mexico was a foregone conclusion. Wal-Mart’s subsidiary, Walmex,
received authorization to open a full-fledged deposit-taking bank in
November 2006.6 Banco Wal-Mart de Mexico Adelante (Adelante) (in
English, “forward”) will launch operations in late 2007.7 Some big banks
may have grumbled privately on news of Wal-Mart’s entry, but no U.S.style public outcry ensued. Might Wal-Mart bank be good for Mexico?
By emerging markets standards, Mexico’s banks are well-capitalized
and competently regulated.8 Yet three out of four Mexicans do not use
banking services.9 Since 1982, the entire banking sector has been
nationalized and privatized—twice.10 Three institutions hold over 60% of
all bank assets, control the payments system and the sole private credit
bureau; close to 80% of the banking assets are foreign-owned.11 Bank
lending to the private sector in Mexico historically has lagged behind
lending in comparable developing economies. Mexican banks have lent at
less than one-third the rate of banks in Chile, and at about half the rate of
banks in Brazil.12 In late 2003, lending suddenly took off for reasons that

Stymied Wal-Mart’s Bid to Own a Bank, WALL ST. J., Oct 23, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, WSJNL File; NCRC Says “Don’t Bank with Wal-Mart!,” The Community Investment
Network, http://www.communityinvestmentnetwork.org/index.php?id=1047 (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
5
In early November 2006, Mexico’s Finance Minister Francisco Gil Diaz promised to approve
Walmex’s license application before leaving office later that month. See Carlos Manuel Rodriguez &
Valerie Rota, Wal-Mart de Mexico to Get Banking License Within Days, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 10,
2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=anVF7F2Vnqf4&refer=latin_america.
6
Resolución por la que se autoriza la organización y operación de una institución de banca
múltiple denominada Banco Wal-Mart de México Adelante, S.A., Institución de Banca Múltiple (2006)
[hereinafter Adelante Resolution].
7
Press Release, Wal-Mart de Mexico, Bank Authorization: Wal-Mart de Mexico Obtains a
License to Organize and Operate a Bank (Nov. 22, 2006), available at http://media.corporateir.net/media_files/irol/13/130639/news/PressReleasebankinglicense.pdf; Elisabeth Malkin, Warm
Welcome for Mexican Wal-Mart Bank, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 24, 2006, at 13, available at LEXIS,
News Library, IHT File.
8
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 06/350: MEXICO—FINANCIAL
SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT UPDATE 6 (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/
longres.cfm?sk=19978 (follow “Free Full Text” hyperlink) [hereinafter 2006 FSSA].
9
See John P. Caskey et al., The Unbanked in Mexico and the United States 32–47 (2004),
available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/FinancialSectorWeb.nsf/Search?openform (search for
“Caskey” then follow article link) for analysis of the frequently-cited 2002 survey by Istituto National
de Estadistica Geografia e Informática (INEGI) on financial services penetration in Mexico. See also
William Britt Gwinner et al., From Financial Exclusion to Inclusion: Increasing the Availability of
Credit to the Urban Poor in Latin America, EN BREVE (World Bank), Nov. 2006, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENBREVE/Newsletters/21217493/Nov06_98_FinExclSolo
v2.pdf; Tova M. Solo, Financial Exclusion: A New Angle to Urban Poverty in Latin America, EN
BREVE (World Bank), Sept. 2005, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENBREVE/
Newsletters/20843573/77SEP05Finan.pdf.
10
See, e.g., BARBARA STALLINGS & ROGERIO STUDART, FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT: LATIN
AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 186–91 (2006).
11
2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 11.
12
See, e.g., STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 185; FITCH RATINGS, BANK SYSTEMIC
RISK REPORT 12 (2007), available at http://www.fitchratings.com.
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experts continue to debate; the most dramatic growth has come from nonbank loans to consumers.13
This simplistic overview highlights the peculiarities of the banking
landscape onto which Wal-Mart ventured in August 2006, its avowed
mission to “bankariz[e]” the unbanked.14 Whatever the pros and cons of a
Wal-Mart bank might be in the United States, they look quite different in
an environment where, despite recent growth, there is little credit, no
competition, and a fresh history of political, economic, and legal
instability. Wal-Mart is among the few actors capable of dislodging the
dysfunctional status quo.
Even though its entry might bring unique benefits for Mexico, the new
bank presents a transnational regulatory dilemma. As long as Adelante
remains Wal-Mart’s only banking venture worldwide, the Mexican
authorities will have sole responsibility for regulating and supervising it.
Because it is Wal-Mart’s first banking venture worldwide, the corporate
headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas will likely take a keen interest in the
new bank. But Wal-Mart’s Mexican hosts—formally the “home” regulator
of its banking operations—have at best indirect leverage over its
unregulated U.S. parent. This raises the possibility of a supervisory gap,
where no authority has a comprehensive view of the entire corporate
structure containing the bank. Wal-Mart’s case is unusual: all other
foreign-owned banks in Mexico have parents that are themselves regulated
institutions in the home country and are subject to comprehensive
consolidated supervision by their home authorities.
The anomaly has implications beyond Wal-Mart and Mexico. The
emerging transnational regime for bank regulation and supervision,
anchored in the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, is an array of best
practices, core principles, and coordination mechanisms that sprung up in
response to the spread of financial conglomerates and financial crises. It
has inspired a rich academic debate about the efficacy and legitimacy of its
approach as a case of global governance.15 Its work often appears as a
progressive march to close supervisory gaps.16 Wal-Mart’s bank in
Mexico reveals a particularly challenging gap.

13
INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT NO. 05/428: MEXICO—SELECTED ISSUES 50,
74–77 (2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=18758 (follow “Free
Full Text” hyperlink) [hereinafter 2005 SELECTED ISSUES].
14
Adler, supra note 1.
15
See generally DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL (forthcoming 2007) (assessing the
Basel Capital Accords as a set of internationally-derived norms from the perspective of domestic
financial regulation); Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15 (2006) (discussing legitimacy and accountability in the work of the
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision as an instance of global administrative law).
16
TARULLO, supra note 15, at 154.
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The gap looks both intractable and inevitable, a function of the
substantive diversity in bank regulation at the national level.
Notwithstanding recent efforts to harmonize bank supervision and capital
adequacy requirements, states retain considerable autonomy over
regulation.17 For example, while the United States has historically barred
commercial firms from owning banks, Mexico has not.18 This makes it
possible for an unregulated entity in the United States to open a bank in
Mexico, with Mexico as the home (and only) regulator.
This Article argues that the apparent gap, or the home-host hole,
carries risks for Mexico; however, it cautions against rushing in to patch it
with more centralized regulation. For now, the hole seems to pose a
limited risk to global financial stability. An effort to close it at the
international level will likely put the interests of the international financial
system and regulators in major financial centers before those of the
emerging markets hosts.19 If the patching exercise redistributes regulatory
authority further away from host country regulators, Mexico may come out
the bigger loser.
At the time of this writing, Adelante has yet to start operations. One
can only speculate about Wal-Mart’s intentions based on its public
announcements. The discussion that follows is necessarily stylized and
hypothetical—the Article tries to identify the potential implications of a
Wal-Mart bank for Mexico and for transnational regulation, rather than
attempting to evaluate the impact of an existing institution. With all parts
in motion, the aim is to identify some issues to watch as the scenarios
unfold.
Following this introduction, Part II of the Article elaborates on the
Mexican banking context. Part III offers background on Wal-Mart’s retail
presence in Mexico. Part IV draws out the potential implications for
Mexico of its expansion into banking. Part V explores Wal-Mart’s
Mexican banking experiment from the perspective of transnational
regulation. Part VI concludes.
II. PERENNIAL PUZZLES IN MEXICAN BANKING
Mexico’s financial system has long stumped analysts and policymakers. It has stubbornly lagged behind counterparts in other developing
countries in providing credit to the economy, with bank lending to the
17
See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CORE
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION 6 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs129.pdf [hereinafter BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES].
18
See infra notes 82–93 and accompanying text.
19
Cf. Raj Bhala, Tragedy, Irony, and Protectionism After BCCI: A Three-Act Play Starring
Maharajah Bank, 48 SMU L. REV. 11 (1994) (arguing that excessive regulation of international
banking in major financial centers such as the United States will disproportionately harm banks from
developing countries).
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private sector at about 20% of GDP even after the recent lending surge.20
Chilean banks lend at over 60%; and Mexico’s closest counterpart Brazil
boasts bank credit to the private sector at over 40% of GDP.21 Banks in
emerging Asian economies often lend at over 100% of GDP.22 Lending
levels in advanced economies range from about 60% for the United States,
where capital markets play an important role,23 to over 100% for France,
Germany and Japan, where banks dominate.24 Until recently, bank lending
was low in Russia,25 but that is hardly comforting for Mexico: Russia’s
private banks are children of the 1990s transition, whereas Mexico’s
largest banking institutions go back over 100 years. Each new decade has
brought new diagnoses and policy prescriptions, but low lending levels
persist.
As part of power consolidation in late 19th century, the federal
government awarded bank licenses with special privileges to business
magnates. The result was a pattern of monopolies and oligopolies that
allowed banks to make profits in exchange for financing the government
while it was shut out of the international bond markets.26 Although the
banking sector was effectively nationalized and privatized three times in
the 20th century, many of its early features continued for most of its
history. 27 These include extreme concentration, close ties between banks
20
STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 185, 195 (citing overall domestic finance to firms at
28% of GDP in Mexico, 82% in Brazil, and 174% in Chile, and bank loans to the private sector at 18%
of GDP in Mexico, one-quarter of Chile’s levels). See FITCH RATINGS, supra note 12, at 12 for less
stark but still significant multiples. Cf. 2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 13. Estimates cited in this and the
following footnotes measure different aspects of financial intermediation; Mexico comes out behind by
any measure.
21
FITCH RATINGS, supra note 12, at 12; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT
06/336: CHILE—SELECTED ISSUES 53 (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06336.pdf (citing bank credit to the private sector stable at just over 60% of GDP)
and INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT 06/335: CHILE—ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—
STAFF REPORT 28 (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06335.pdf
(citing 80% of GDP for a slightly broader measure of bank credit). The disparities are smaller for
domestic capital markets, but there too Mexico lags. See, e.g., STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10,
at 198–201.
22
See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, supra note 12, at 12.
23
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT 06/278: UNITED STATES—SELECTED
ISSUES 36 (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=19491 (follow
“Free Full Text” hyperlink).
24
See, e.g., FITCH RATINGS, supra note 12, at 12.
25
Id.
26
See JAMES BARTH ET AL., RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS GOVERN 262–65
(2006); NOEL MAURER, THE POWER AND THE MONEY: THE MEXICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 1876–1932,
at 34–47 (2002) (on the political accommodations that structured Mexico’s financial sector); id. at 115–
33 (on early bank-industry ties); Stephen Haber, Banking with and Without Deposit Insurance:
Mexico’s Banking Experiments, 1884–2004, at 6, 10 (2005), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~
haber/papers.html (follow the “Banking With and Without Deposit Insurance in Mexico” hyperlink).
See generally JEFFREY BORTZ & STEPHEN HABER, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY, 1870–1930: ESSAYS ON
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS, REVOLUTION, AND GROWTH (2002).
27
MAURER, supra note 26, at 153–59; see also STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 186–
87, 189; OSVALDO SANTIN QUIROZ, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEXICO’S FINANCIAL REFORM 139–
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and the leading industrial families, connected lending and a habit of special
deals with the government.28
Government-owned development banks are another key part of the
Mexican landscape. The oldest, Nacional Financiera (NAFINSA), was
established in the 1930s and played a central role in the industrialization
drive that followed World War II.29 These institutions borrow funds in the
capital markets and on-lend them for specified policy goals. For much of
their history, the development banks have lent to large conglomerates (the
country’s largest employers) in parallel with commercial banks.30 Because
companies used development banks to finance their riskiest projects, these
institutions have suffered disproportionately high default rates.31
NAFINSA’s mandate shifted recently to focus on small and medium-size
enterprise (SME) lending.32
Historically, the largest Mexican corporations have had better access to
international portfolio capital than their counterparts elsewhere in Latin
America. These companies rely on U.S. banks and capital markets for
their funding needs. However, when international markets close, the top
firms turn to Mexican banks. Companies in the next tier get credit from
Mexican banks, suppliers, and corporate affiliates. Small and medium-size
firms rely less on the banks, and more on suppliers, friends, family, and
government programs. All but the wealthiest consumers use cash. 33
Mexico’s debt crisis that began in 1982 wiped out bank capital and
prompted a wholesale nationalization of the banking sector. Banks were
reprivatized as part of a wave of structural reforms that accompanied Baker
and Brady Plan debt restructuring.34 The privatization process included a
requirement that banking institutions be controlled by Mexican nationals
41 (2001); Haber, supra note 26, at 3, 16; Stephen Haber, Mexico’s Experiments with Bank
Privatization and Liberalization, 1991–2002, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 2325 (2004). Beyond effective
ownership changes, the government exercised a high degree of control over private banks at various
times, including after World War II. See, e.g., QUIROZ, supra, at 85–87; STALLINGS & STUDART, supra
note 10, at 186.
28
See generally Haber, supra note 26 (discussing Mexico’s history of bank concentration and
connected lending); MAURER, supra note 26, at 1 (noting the roots of Mexican bank concentration and
its persistence). Although the banking sector has remained concentrated, links between banks and
Mexico’s large industrial groups—a defining feature of the sector for much of the 20th century—have
weakened or disappeared by the mid-2000s. See Leonardo Martinez, Waiting for the Barbarians: The
Politics of Banking-Sector Opening in Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia (1988–2005) 235 (2006)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author).
29
See Haber, supra note 26, at 16.
30
See, e.g., STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 197; QUIROZ, supra note 27, at 84–85.
31
See Haber, supra note 26, at 5; 2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 16; INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 01/192: MEXICO—FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 33 (2001),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=15443.0 [hereinafter 2001 FSSA].
32
Nacional Financiera, Organization and Objective, http://www.nafin.com/portalnf/?action=
Content&sectionID=6&catID=154 (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
33
STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 202–03, 215–17.
34
For background on the Baker and Brady initiatives, see, for example, LEX RIEFFEL,
RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC MACHINERY 149–77 (2003).
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and another that prohibited control by non-financial companies. The
second of these was observed in letter: as before, the banks went to
prominent Mexican industrial families, who used them in significant part
to funnel money to related enterprises. Related loans accounted for much
of the brief lending boom in the early 1990s.35 Credit to the private sector
grew by up to 30% annually, from under 20% of GDP in the late 1980s to
40% by 1995.36 The 1994 Tequila Crisis ended the boom.37 Related loans
were nearly twice as likely to default during the crisis; recovery values for
this group were one-third lower than for arm’s length lending.38
After multiple failed bank restructuring programs in the late 1990s, the
pressing need to inject new capital in the system trumped nationalist
sensibilities.39 Foreigners were invited to buy the banks, and they did.
Four of the five institutions that controlled close to 80% of all bank assets
went to Spain’s BBVA and Santander, Britain’s HSBC, and Citigroup.
Canada’s Bank of Nova Scotia established a significant presence. Of the
top five banks, Banorte alone remained in the hands of Mexican nationals;
at 5% of total assets, it lags behind the other four. The largest institutions
together control the payments system and the sole private credit bureau.40
The new owners quickly recapitalized the banks, but lending levels
barely budged. This had a host of reasonable explanations. First, the
banks may have been reluctant to lend to the private sector as long as they
could get a reasonable return from financing the government. A
succession of government programs took bad loans off bank books, and
replaced them with government bonds that yielded interest rates sufficient
to keep banks profitable. Second, new regulatory discipline in the
aftermath of the crisis made banks more risk-averse. Lingering worries
about macroeconomic instability reinforced the aversion, as did the dearth
of credit information. Credit assessment is limited: there is one public and
one private credit registry. The public registry, established in the 1960s,
has very limited coverage by design and is rarely used. The private one is
35

Rafael LaPorta et al., Related Lending, 118 Q.J. ECON. 231, 233, 244–50 (2003).
See, e.g., STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 187.
37
The crisis involved a steep fall in the value of the Mexican currency, which in turn caused
pervasive defaults on dollar-denominated and other debts to Mexican banks. See, e.g., Francisco Gil
Diaz, The China Syndrome or the Tequila Crisis 8–11 (Center for Res. on Econ. Dev. & Pol’y Reform,
Working Paper No. 77, 2000) (describing the circumstances leading up to and economic effects of the
Tequila Crisis).
38
LaPorta et al., supra note 35, at 255–59. In contrast to LaPorta et al., Haber and Mauer argue
that related lending was a sensible and beneficial strategy pursued by private Mexican banks
throughout their history to overcome information asymmetries and shortcomings in the legal and
institutional environment. Haber, supra note 26; MAURER, supra note 26, at 198–99.
39
See, e.g., STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 196–97; Martinez, supra note 28, at 195–
99. Citi has been in Mexico since the 1920s. See, e.g., STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 195;
Martinez, supra note 28, at 130.
40
2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 35.
36
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jointly owned by the largest banks; it compiles information on the largest
corporate borrowers, and limits access for non-members on the margins.41
Finally, a popular explanation for low lending levels pointed to inadequate
laws and institutions. Contract enforcement takes longer and costs more in
Mexico than in high-income countries or in the emerging economies of
East Asia; Mexico is about average for all of Latin America and the
Caribbean.42 Until recently, secured lending was considered non-viable
because of the difficulty in enforcing against collateral.
Following the Tequila Crisis, Mexico overhauled its regulatory
apparatus.43 A unitary financial regulator, the National Banking and
Securities Commission (CNBV) was given the mandate to oversee the
financial sector. The Ministry of Finance remained in charge of new
license applications and the Central Bank retained responsibility for
deposit insurance, but CNBV has enjoyed increasing independence.
Previously unlimited deposit insurance is now subject to a $130,000 cap.44
The cap is very high by international standards—for example, it is
generally $100,000 per depositor per insured bank in the United States.45
The deposit insurance agency, the Bank Savings Protection Institute
(IPAB), established in 1999, has virtually no assets because of the
obligations it inherited from the last crisis.46
As noted earlier, the authorities also reoriented the government banks
to provide SME and rural credit, and established two new kinds of nonbank financial institutions, sofoles and sofomes, which take no deposits and
focus on specialized lending such as mortgages, consumer and SME
loans.47 Some, but not all of these new institutions are governmentfinanced. Beyond the banking sector, new laws on bankruptcy and secured
credit aimed to streamline debt collection and inject more certainty into the
process.48
In parallel with legal and regulatory reforms, the

41
See Jose Luis Negrin, Credit Information Sharing Mechanisms in Mexico: Evaluation,
Perspectives and Effects on Small Firm Credit 2 (Center for Res. on Econ. Dev. & Pol’y Reform,
Working Paper No. 114, 2001), available at http://scid.stanford.edu/pdf/credpr114.pdf.
42
2005 SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 13, at 56–57.
43
See 2001 FSSA, supra note 31, at 18-19; THE REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND OTHER COUNTRIES 11 (Anjali
Kumar et al. eds., 1997).
44
Sidaoui, supra note 2, at 283.
45
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Insuring Your Deposits, available at http://www.fdic.
gov/deposit/deposits/insuringdeposits/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
46
CANADA DEPOSIT INS. CORP., INTERNATIONAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE SURVEY: MEXICO 3
(2003), available at http://www.iadi.org/html/Default.aspx?MenuID=212 (follow “IPAB—Mexico
(Full)” hyperlink); see also 2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 8, 27 (noting IPAB’s weakened financial
position and advocating for improving its financial condition).
47
2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 11; STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 217–18.
48
2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 46–48, 63–65.
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macroeconomic environment has stabilized since 2001 and inflation has
virtually disappeared, now running at an annual rate of just under 4%.49
Beginning in 2003, consumer lending took off. According to some
estimates in 2005, consumer loans grew by 48% year on year; analysts
estimate 2006 growth at 37%.50 This growth comes on a very low base—
consumer lending was less than 10% of total lending in Mexico in 2002, up
from less than 3% in 1999.51 Much of the new credit has come from the
new special purpose lenders and non-banks.52 Among non-banks, large
retailers, car and appliance vendors have played a key role, along with
sofoles and sofomes. Unlike the United States, Mexico allows unregulated
non-bank commercial and industrial companies to own full-service
banks.53 Aside from Wal-Mart, several other retailers have sought to open
banks on the back of the lending boom; one has operated successfully since
2002.54 On the other hand, small-scale community banking is still virtually
nonexistent. Compartamos, a microfinance provider, has expanded the
number of borrowers served sixfold over the past seven years, and has
recently secured a full banking license; however, it is still a small niche
player.55
Conventional wisdom attributes the boom in part to demographic
trends that in turn point to consumption growth.56 No doubt structural
reforms and macroeconomic stability are important background factors. In
addition, government policies targeted at boosting mortgage lending
played a part.
On the other hand, fees and interest rates on the new loans are
spectacularly high, especially considering that inflation is in the single
digits. In 2004, Citigroup charged an annual rate of 85% in Mexico on
credit cards whose U.S. counterparts cost 9%; Scotiabank charged 77% in
Mexico, 18% in Canada.57 In recent years, high fees have driven bank
49
Patrick Harrington, Mexico’s Inflation Slows to Within Target in January, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&refer=&sid=aIrG8zIT52Uw.
50
See, e.g., Courtines & Partida, supra note 2, at 3.
51
STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 210. A JPMorgan report cites consumer loans at
almost 30% of all performing bank loans excluding loans to the government in early 2006. Courtines
& Partida, supra note 2, at 3.
52
STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 10, at 217–18.
53
See infra notes 81–93 and accompanying text.
54
See id.
55
Special Report: Mexico Banking—Changing Landscape, LATIN FIN., Sept. 2006, available at
LEXIS, News Library, LAFN File [hereinafter Changing Landscape].
56
Special Report: Eternal Youth, LATIN FIN., Sept. 2006, available at LEXIS, News Library,
LAFN File.
57
Banks Aggressively Promote Use of Credit Cards in Mexico, SOURCEMEX, Apr. 6, 2005,
http://retanet.unm.edu/LADB-articles/25954.html. The figures reflect a comparison of total annual
costs of credit drawn from a fifteen-month study by the financial sector consumer protection watchdog
CONDUSEF (a Mexican government agency), released in September 2004. Press Release,
CONDUSEF, Comunicados de Prensa, Cominucado 012 (Sept. 6, 2004), available at http://www.cond
usef.gob.mx/Conoce/comunicados/2004/0012_04.html.
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Charges and administrative restrictions make transferring
profits.
accounts between banks prohibitive even for those Mexicans that have
accounts. Large banks still limit lending to the wealthiest individuals. For
example, Banamex requires a minimum income of $900 per month for the
most basic consumer loan, while 60% of all Mexicans earn less than four
times the minimum wage, or $522 per month.59 Retailers that target lowerincome groups charge higher interest rates. Despite complaints about the
weakness of legal enforcement systems, default rates on consumer debt are
in the low single digits.60 Some suggest that consumer debt is easier to
enforce, partly thanks to recent changes in secured credit laws, but also
thanks to “innovative collection techniques” such as sending a company
agent to the debtor’s home.
In sum, Mexico historically has had trouble achieving substantial
levels of intermediation in the economy. A 2002 government survey
reported that more than three-quarters of all Mexicans had no access to
financial services.61 Experts have debated the causes, but no prescription
to date has offered a durable solution. Government banks have contributed
to post-war industrialization, but over time have become a costly subsidy
and have not played a big role in intermediating savings. Foreign entry
helped recapitalize banks after the Tequila crisis, but has not altered the
extreme concentration of assets in the sector or the large banks’
predilection for financing only the largest and wealthiest borrowers. The
recent explosion in consumer lending could be a promising breakthrough, a
dangerous bubble, or some combination of the two.
III. ENTER WALMEX
Mexico is Wal-Mart’s first, largest, and probably most successful
international venture; the subsidiary brought in 25% of Wal-Mart’s foreign
sales in 2005.62 It started in 1992 as an alliance with Grupo Cifra,63 which
owned an established chain of self-service stores. The experiment was
unusually successful: Wal-Mart gained market share and stayed afloat
through the Tequila crisis. When other U.S. retailers left Mexico, WalMart plunged in deeper and bought a controlling stake in Cifra in 1997.64
58

Id.; Changing Landscape, supra note 55.
Special Report: Mexico Consumer Finance—Reaching the Base, LATIN FIN., Sept. 2006,
available at LEXIS, News Library, LAFN File.
60
Id. (citing a default rate of 2.5%).
61
Caskey et al., supra note 9, at 33.
62
Douglas E. Thomas & Fernan Gonzalez, Wal-Mart de Mexico—2005, in FRED R. DAVID,
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND CASES (11th ed. 2007) (manuscript at 2).
63
WalMart-México: History, http://www.walmartmexico.com.mx/acercai.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2007).
64
Id.; see also Chris Tilly, Wal-Mart in Mexico: The Limits of Growth, in WAL-MART: THE FACE
OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM 195–96 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) (noting that the
success of the Wal-Mart-Cifra venture has far surpassed that of other retailers in Mexico).
59
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In 2000, the company became Wal-Mart de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., or
Walmex.
By 2001, Walmex controlled half of all supermarket sales in Mexico,
was the country’s largest private sector employer,66 and the third largest
company in Mexico by market capitalization.67 At this writing, Walmex
owns over 850 retail outlets around Mexico.68 One study put Walmex’s
retail market share at 55% in 2005.69 However, this figure may be
misleading considering the prevalence of informal retail outlets such as
street stalls.70 In February 2007, Walmex sales growth remained solidly in
the double digits, even as Wal-Mart’s U.S. growth slowed.71 Walmex
projected more growth and geographic expansion going forward.72
Although it offers several store formats and restaurants in Mexico,
including some catering to lower-income groups,73 Walmex clientele is
primarily middle income urban residents. Its presence is concentrated in
the country’s central region; it has had more trouble in the wealthier north
and has only a smattering of outlets in the poorer areas.74 A recent study
suggests that Walmex’s wage and benefit practices are in line with the rest
of the retail sector.75 Apart from a high-profile incident surrounding
construction of a store near a historic cite, Walmex has drawn minimal
controversy in Mexico, especially when compared to its polarizing effect
65

WalMart-México: History, supra note 63.
Tilly, supra note 64, at 189, 196.
67
Mexico’s Soriana to Spend $300 Million to Expand, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 29, 2004,
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000086&sid=aJO0sK1L0pzU&refer=news_index.
68
WalMart-México: History, supra note 63.
69
Thomas & Gonzalez, supra note 62, manuscript at 4.
70
Tilly, supra note 64, at 203–04.
71
Press Release, Wal-Mart de Mexico, Wal-Mart de Mexico Reports February 2007 Sales (Mar.
8, 2007), available at http://library.corporate-ir.net/library/13/130/130639/items/235104/February07.pdf
(reporting that Walmex’s sales were up 18.4% in nominal terms, about 14% in real terms over last
year). See, e.g., John Lyons, In Mexico, Wal-Mart Is Defying Its Critics, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2007,
A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reports “slowing” growth for Wal-Mart in the
United States in contrast to rapid growth in Mexico and other emerging markets).
72
Wal-Mart de Mexico plans to open 125 stores in 2007, compared to 120 in 2006. Associated
Press, Wal-Mart de Mexico Sets 2007 Expansion, FORBES.COM, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/
feeds/ap/2007/02/13/ap3424024.html. The company expects to increase store space overall by 12%.
Id. See also JPMorgan, Wal-Mart de Mexico: Upward Estimates Revision on Analyst Meeting, Feb.
14, 2007 (on file with Connecticut Law Review).
73
Id.; see also Lyons, supra note 71 (reporting the political prominence of Wal-Mart’s benefits to
the poor, but also describing Wal-Mart shopping as a “high-end experience”); Tilly, supra note 64.
74
Compare WalMart-México: Geographical Distribution, http://www.walmartmexico.com.
mx/acercai.html?id=24.571576473498563 (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (showing a high concentration of
stores in Mexico’s central region, fewer stores in the north, and very few stores in the southwest region)
with WORLD BANK, POVERTY IN MEXICO: AN ASSESSMENT OF CONDITIONS, TRENDS AND
GOVERNMENT STRATEGY, at xxvi (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org (follow “Countries”
hyperlink, then follow “Mexico” hyperlink, then follow “Publications & Reports” hyperlink, then
follow “Poverty in Mexico” hyperlink) (showing that a high concentration of the nation’s poorest
people live in the southwest region).
75
Tilly, supra note 64, at 190.
66
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in the United States. It has won prestigious corporate social responsibility
awards for its business practices and charitable activities, including
hurricane response.76
Wal-Mart’s entry did have a dramatic effect on Mexico’s formal retail
sector and, in particular, on the relationship between retailers and
suppliers. As in the United States, the company has extracted deep
discounts from suppliers (many of which are based in Mexico77) and
passed them on to customers. As in the United States, it has put small
shops out of business, though the magnitude of the effect is debated.78
More visibly, it has forced other large Mexican chains to adopt similar
practices. In addition to squeezing suppliers, three of Walmex’s largest
competitors formed a buyer’s cooperative, initially blocked but later
sanctioned by the national antitrust authorities.79
IV. ON WITH ADELANTE
Before applying to start its own bank, Walmex had a consumer credit
program with GE Capital, a credit card program with BBVA Bancomer,
and another with American Express.80 The license application for Banco
Wal-Mart de Mexico Adelante proposed to capitalize the bank at about $25
million; official announcements have said that the bank would start by
offering savings accounts, credit cards and basic lines of credit, and would
expand into mortgages and insurance.81
When Walmex filed its
application, at least one other large Mexican retail chain, Grupo Elektra
(Elektra), had been operating a full-service bank for over three years.82
Several other retailers applied for and received licenses in 2006.83
76
Thomas & Gonzalez, supra note 62, manuscript at 3; WalMart-México, Letter from the
Chairman of the Board, Wal-Mart CEO, Feb. 9, 2007, http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/
13/130639/cg/MessagefromtheCharimanoftheBoard.pdf; WalMart-México, Letter from the Chief
Executive Officer, http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/13/130639/cg/MessagefromtheChief
ExecutiveOfficer.pdf.
77
Ninety percent of the goods sold in Wal-Mart are sourced in Mexico. Thomas & Gonzalez,
supra note 62, manuscript at 3.
78
Tilly, supra note 64, at 197–98; see also Lyons, supra note 71 (describing Walmex’s
competition with large supermarket chains and smaller specialty stores owned by local power brokers).
79
Tilly, supra note 64, at 199.
80
WAL-MART DE MEXICO, ANNUAL REPORT 2005: FOCUSING ON PRIORITIES 11 (2005),
available at http://library.corporate-ir.net/library/13/130/130639/items/189890/2005_ar.pdf. For
information on BBVA Bancomer, see BBVA Bancomer, Description, http://www.bancomer.com.mx/
nuestrom/nuestromi/nuemu_engli_corin_main.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
81
Adler, supra note 1.
82
See Banco Azteca, Who Are We?: Our History, http://www.bancoazteca.com.mx/PortalBanco
Azteca/publica/conocenos/historia/nuestra.jsp (last visited Feb. 17, 2007); Grupo Elektra, What is
Grupo Elektra?: Company Profile, http://www.grupoelektra.com.mx/elektra/English/whatis/profile/
default.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).
83
Associated Press, Wal-Mart’s Mexican Unit to Launch Bank: Division Says it Will Open Them
as Soon as OK Given by Regulators, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/14171601/ (reporting that Grupo Famsa has been licensed to provide banking services and
Controladora Comercial Mexicana has announced that it will partner with a French banking group to
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The experience of Elektra’s bank, Banco Azteca, is instructive.
Elektra is part of the large media, telecommunications and retail
conglomerate Grupo Salinas.84 Elektra’s stores sell primarily electronics,
appliances, furniture and household goods, but the group also has a
pension fund and an insurance company.85 Elektra was among Mexico’s
largest consumer credit providers even before it started a bank.86 Banco
Azteca’s declared mission is to serve the unbanked, whom it puts at 70%
of the Mexican population.87 Since the bank’s establishment, business has
grown rapidly: in 2006, the company reported over 40% year-on-year
growth in the number of accounts, and over 30% growth in net deposits.88
With over $2.4 billion in savings accounts, over $1.5 billion in credit
outstanding and 1500 branches spread among Elektra’s retail outlets,
Azteca claims to be “among the two largest banks in Mexico in terms of
coverage.”89 While it offers a diverse range of products, including savings
and investment accounts, credit cards, mortgages, personal and business
loans, three-quarters of Azteca’s business is consumer credit—installment
loans to finance the acquisition of consumer durables sold in Elektra
stores.90 Default rates have been low. Azteca claims to have started
operations with over 2800 credit managers,91 and has reportedly used
aggressive collection tactics, including home visits.92 In addition to
Mexico, Azteca has branches in Panama and is planning operations in
Honduras.93
offer banking services); Cyntia Barrera Diaz, Update 4-Wal-Mart Mexico Sees No Bank Profits Until
2011, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSN27491794
20061127 (reporting that Wal-Mart’s Adelante bank is one of five new retailer-operated banks opening
in Mexico).
84
Grupo Salinas, GS Companies: Grupo Elektra, http://www.gruposalinas.com/english/
companies/elektra.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
85
Id.
86
Lucy Conger, A Bold Experiment at Banco Azteca, OUTLOOK J., May 2003, available at
http://www.accenture.com/Global/Research_and_Insights/Outlook/By_Alphabet/CaseAzteca.htm.
87
See Grupo Elektra, Business Units: Banco Azteca, http://www.grupoelektra.com.mx/elektra/
English/Units/Financial/Brands/Banco/default.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
88
See Grupo Elektra Announces 4Q06 EBITDA Growth of 5% to Record of Ps. 1,835 Million,
DOW JONES MARKETWATCH, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/grupo-elektraannounces-4q06-ebitda/story.aspx?guid=%7B412CDAB5-2937-482C-9262-A2044CF3E681%7D
[hereinafter Grupo Elektra 4Q06 EBITDA Growth].
89
Grupo Salinas, supra note 84. Bancomer is ahead of Azteca, with over 1700 branches. See
BBVA Bancomer, supra note 80.
90
BANCO AZTECA, REPORTE DE COMENTARIOS Y ANÁLISIS DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN SOBRE LOS
RESULTADOS DE OPERACIÓN Y SITUACIÓN FINANCIERA AL 30 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2006, at 2 (2006),
http://www.grupoelektra.com.mx/elektra/spanish/download/banco/quarter.asp?ban_id=17&emp_id=1&
indicator=12&pagina=3.
91
Elisabeth Malkin, Wal-Mart Will Offer Retail Banking in Mexico, an Underserved Market,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
92
Supra note 57; see also Susan H. Preston, Borrow Now, Repent Later, LATIN FIN., Sept. 2006,
at 1.
93
Mexico: Banco Azteca Cleared in Honduras, EL FINANCIERO, Feb. 2, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 2159640; Grupo Elektra 4Q06 EBITDA Growth, supra note 88.
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Wal-Mart’s strategy for Adelante appears roughly similar to Elektra’s.
In addition, Wal-Mart is ideally positioned to provide remittance services
in the U.S.-Mexico corridor, reducing costs for one of the world’s largest
remittance channels, that is already one of the world’s most efficient.94
Mexican immigrants in the United States send over $13 billion home every
year; this figure is nearly 80% of the country’s total oil revenues and over
2% of its GDP.95 The largest number of immigrants sends money to
central Mexico, where Wal-Mart’s retail penetration is the highest.96 Since
the Citigroup-Banamex acquisition and, even more so, since the
introduction of consular identity cards available to documented and
undocumented immigrants alike, Mexicans in the United States have
increasingly used formal bank channels to send money home. This has
helped bring cost of remittances down by 60% between 1999 and 2005.97
However, a significant portion of Mexican citizens in the United States
remain unbanked; they are also an important part of Wal-Mart’s customer
base.
In sum, Wal-Mart is entering a banking sector that was
“Walmartized”—dominated by a few giant private players—100 years
before it appeared on the scene. Wal-Mart is among the few firms that can
challenge large banks’ dominance over payments systems and credit
reporting: it has already announced plans to develop credit assessment
systems based on its prior consumer lending experience. Expanding credit
reporting is especially important against the background of a consumer
credit boom. Recent studies suggest that weak credit assessment and the
lack of credit information, against the background of government pressure
to lend, are key factors behind unsustainable credit booms, such as the one
that followed Korea’s financial crisis and economic reforms.98
Of course Wal-Mart’s entry would not by itself create a competitive
banking sector. The most likely scenario might be for Adelante, Azteca
and one or two others to take some market share from the top five
commercial banks and expand service to middle-class consumers. By
94
Remittance costs in the U.S.-Mexico corridor have dropped significantly since the introduction
of a consular identity card (which allows Mexican immigrants to open bank accounts in the United
States) and other measures. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 139 (2006). Only remittances from the United
States to the Philippines are cheaper. Id. at 137.
95
RAUL HERNANDEZ-COSS, THE U.S.-MEXICO REMITTANCE CORRIDOR: LESSONS ON SHIFTING
FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL TRANSFER SYSTEMS 4–5 (2005).
96
APEC Remittances Initiative, Map of the U.S.-Mexico Remittances Corridor,
http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/Maps/us-mexico-remittance-map.pdf (indicating that
most remittance corridors flow to central Mexico); see also supra note 74 and accompanying text
(illustrating that most of Wal-Mart’s Mexican units are in the center of the country).
97
WORLD BANK, supra note 94, at 139.
98
2005 SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 13, at 75–76. For a cross-border comparison of credit
bureaus and a discussion of their role in the credit markets, see Ronald J. Mann, CHARGING AHEAD:
THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 113–18 (2006).
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putting price pressure on the rest, Adelante may become another big player
in the still-concentrated market, but one that is more open to consumers.
Days after receiving the banking license, Walmex surprised analysts by
announcing that it expects no profits from Adelante in the first four years
of operation.99 Analysts generally explained this as a sign that Wal-Mart
will first focus on gaining market share with low-cost basic services. Still,
on balance, Wal-Mart looks like a force for good. Keeping it out would
not help competition, but would simply help preserve market share for
Azteca.
V. THE HOME-HOST HOLE
Walmex got its banking authorization on November 16, 2006, in a
little over three months.100 By then, Wal-Mart’s deposit insurance
application in the United States had been pending for more than a year and
was beginning to look doomed.101 In granting Walmex permission to
operate Adelante, the Mexican authorities—the Finance Ministry, in
consultation with CNBV and the Central Bank—appeared to focus
overwhelmingly on walling off the new bank from the Mexican retail
operation and the U.S. corporate parent. The authorizing resolution, which
stresses the need to promote competition in the financial sector several
times in the preamble and the body, is much more elaborate than the earlier
permits for Banco Azteca in 2002 and Banco Ahorro de Famsa in 2006.102
The Adelante document contains explicit and detailed provisions against
tying bank services to the commercial affiliates’ operations, safeguards on
information exchange, prohibitions on connected transactions, shared
management, infrastructure and resources, transfer pricing abuses, and
annual reporting requirements related to transfer pricing.103 The resolution
does not grant Mexican authorities access to the Mexican parent or to WalMart’s corporate headquarters in the United States. As a subsidiary,
Adelante would be separately capitalized, and could be sanctioned,

99
See, e.g., Adriana Arai, Wal-Mart’s Bank Gambit Wins Embrace in Mexico, BLOOMBERG, Feb.
12, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAQ4K8AlfA7A#.
100
See Adelante Resolution, supra note 6.
101
See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2007).
102
Resolución por la que se autoriza la organización y operación de una institución de banca
múltiple que se denominará Banca Azteca, S.A. (Apr. 4, 2002) (on file with Connecticut Law Review);
Resolución por la que se autoriza la organización y operación de una institución de banca multiple
denominada Banco Ahorro Famsa, S.A., Institución de Banca Múltiple (Aug. 8, 2006) (on file with
Connecticut Law Review). It is possible that the regulators secured privately from the domestic
retailers commitments similar to those it required publicly of Wal-Mart.
103
Adelante Resolution, supra note 6. These and most of the other conditions on the
authorization are set forth in the sixth paragraph of the resolution; the reporting requirement is in the
seventh paragraph.
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suspended or shut down by CNBV for failure to comply with its license
conditions, or for other violations,104 like any Mexican bank.
On October 5, 2006, shortly before Walmex got its bank permit,
Mexico’s Central Bank Governor Guillermo Ortiz gave a keynote address
to a conference of international bank supervisors gathered at a Yucatan
resort.105 In a frank and occasionally dour speech, he questioned Mexico’s
ability to oversee a foreign-owned banking sector and manage the rapid
expansion of commercial firms into banking. Adelante straddles both
these concerns.
Perennially wary of foreign bank ownership, Ortiz suggested that
international conglomerates today make credit policy at the parent level,
driven by global strategy and country risk perceptions, with host country
interests taking the back seat.106 Mexico does not permit foreign banks to
operate through branches; it requires them to establish separately
capitalized subsidiaries that, in theory, give host authorities more control
over their supervision.107 But international banks increasingly book
Mexican loans offshore to maximize tax and regulatory advantages.108
Management trends favor centralization at the parent level, making
figureheads of bank subsidiary CEOs in host countries. In crisis, a host
country faces domestic political pressure against injecting public money
into foreign bank subsidiaries—especially where they are run from
abroad—but parent liability is generally limited to its share in the
capital.109
Addressing the expansion of commercial firms into banking, Ortiz
pointedly cited U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan’s letter to
the U.S. Congress on the risks of allowing firms like Wal-Mart to establish
banks.110 Acknowledging such firms’ role in boosting credit and
104

Id.
Guillermo Ortiz, Governor of the Bank of Mex., Keynote Address at the 14th International
Conference of Banking Supervisors: The Participation of International Banks in Emerging Economies
(Oct. 5, 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r061016b.pdf.
106
Id. at 2–3.
107
See, e.g., id. at 2, 4; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, EVOLVING BANKING SYSTEMS IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY 53 (2007), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap33.pdf.
108
See Ortiz, supra note 105, at 2.
109
Id. at 2, 4.
110
Id. at 5 (citing Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, to Rep. Jim Leach, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 20, 2006), available at
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/files/greenspanlet.1.26.06.pdf). Greenspan did not
refer to Wal-Mart by name in the letter, but did explicitly refer to Wal-Mart in an attachment to the
letter that responded to specific questions posed by Congressman Leach. Letter from Alan Greenspan,
supra. Leach, who had requested Greenspan’s views in connection with a bill he sponsored, stressed
that his concerns went to the loophole in U.S. law that Wal-Mart sought to use rather than to Wal-Mart
specifically. See Press Release, Former Congressman James A. Leach, U.S. House of Representatives,
Greenspan Warns Congress on Industrial Loan Corporations (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.ufcw.org/document.cfm?documentID=777.
105
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competition in Mexico, Ortiz flagged three common concerns with letting
them buy banks: the risk that unregulated affiliates might abuse the bank
safety net, the difficulty of reaching unregulated parts of the corporate
group whose condition may determine the bank’s safety and soundness,
and the heightened risk of anti-competitive behavior, such as tying bank
services to customer and supplier relationships.111
Following Ortiz’s keynote address, the international bank supervisors’
gathering approved a revised version of the Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision, as promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel,
Switzerland.112 This was the first revision of the principles since they were
first promulgated amid the international financial crises of the late
1990s.113 The principles themselves and the accompanying Core Principles
Methodology (which contains more elaborate guidance on their
application)114 are not binding; however, they are widely understood as the
authoritative statement of best practices in the area, and form the basis of
national financial sector assessments by institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).115
The Core Principles emerged as a specific response to crises in
emerging markets countries and involved an unusual degree of
consultation with officials in these countries.116 The Basel Committee had
previously considered minimum standards of supervision from the
perspective of major financial centers; however, the ensuing calamity made
these efforts appear patently inadequate.117 The Core Principles focused on
harmonizing and coordinating supervision—the process of overseeing
bank compliance with substantive regulations. Basel-based efforts stopped
far short of regulatory convergence;118 regulatory harmonization has been
generally limited to capital adequacy.119 As a result, substantive
111

Ortiz, supra note 105, at 5–6.
See BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17.
113
Id. at 1; DUNCAN WOOD, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING: THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND THE
POLITICS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 100–22 (2005) (describing the roots of the Core Principles in
the 1990s financial crises and efforts to reform the International Financial Architecture).
114
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CORE PRINCIPLES
METHODOLOGY (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.pdf [hereinafter BASEL
METHODOLOGY].
115
BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 17, at 1; see also 2006 FSSA, supra note 8, at 32–38
(applying the Basel Core Principles in a financial system stability assessment of Mexico).
116
WOOD, supra note 113, at 106–08.
117
MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL BANKING STANDARD 22, 26 (1997)
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differences have continued in areas such as universal banking and bank
ownership by commercial firms, among others.
The last two of the twenty-five Core Principles are central both to
Ortiz’s thesis and to the case of a Wal-Mart bank in Mexico. Principle 24
re-emphasizes the importance of prudential supervision of a banking group
on a consolidated basis worldwide, including the supervisors’ power to
oversee both foreign and non-banking activities of the banks incorporated
within their jurisdiction, to have timely access to information about such
activities, and the capacity to restrict offshore non-financial activities in the
interests of safety and soundness.120 Principle 25 frames the cooperation of
home and host country authorities responsible for international banking
conglomerates, including communications channels and division of
responsibilities.121
Consolidated supervision and the home-host relationship were at the
center of the Basel Committee’s work long before the Core Principles.
However, the focus in the most prominent early incidents, such as the ones
involving the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and
Daiwa Bank, had been on major financial centers as hosts.122 By the late
1990s, banks from major financial centers were expanding on the
periphery.123 At the same time, the Committee’s efforts to harmonize and
improve supervision of financial conglomerates were helping to expand the
authority of home regulators.124
Because Wal-Mart is not regulated in the United States, Mexico would
be—at least on paper—the “home” supervisor for Adelante, and would be
responsible for comprehensive consolidated supervision of Wal-Mart to the
extent relevant for the safety and soundness of the local bank. The U.S.
Federal Reserve has recently given Mexico high marks for its capacity to
exercise cross-border consolidated supervision of local and foreign-owned
banks. But the Fed expressed the judgment in its “host” capacity, when it
approved Mexican banks’ applications to do business in the United States;
none of the cases involved a Mexican bank subsidiary of an unregulated
foreign parent.125 On the other hand, the IMF noted in its otherwise upbeat
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assessment of Mexico’s regulatory capacity that the lack of “full-fledged”
consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates “complicates early
detection of group-wide risks”. The Fund also stressed the need for
enhanced cooperation with the home regulators of the foreign-owned
banks.126 All these concerns resonate in the case of Adelante, where
despite its formal status as a home regulator, in practice, Mexico is in the
position of a host, and one with exceedingly limited leverage over those
parts of the corporate bank group located outside Mexico.
The disconnect between its formal and substantive authority is risky
for Mexico. For example, a business like Wal-Mart might be tempted to
ride the consumer lending boom in Mexico, using its Mexican bank
subsidiary in the short term to make up for flagging U.S. sales, pending a
new home-based growth strategy.127 A further rapid, large-scale credit
expansion in a sector already growing by over 30% a year could easily turn
unsustainable. A rash of consumer defaults could have systemic financial
and political consequences in Mexico. Moreover, should the lending boom
go bust, or in the event of a macroeconomic shock of the sort that regularly
befall the emerging markets, the bank subsidiary may seek liquidity from
Mexico’s Central Bank. Should the bank fail, it would have a claim
against Mexico’s deposit insurance fund.128
Here the parent retailer’s size and political power become allimportant. As the country’s largest private sector employer, Walmex
would be in an unusually strong position to demand support from the
Mexican government by threatening to abandon the bank along with its
labor-intensive retail operation. Neither foreign banks operating in
Mexico, nor Mexican retailers that have opened banks, have similar
leverage. Citibank has no shops; Azteca cannot leave.
Mexico’s approach to managing such risks in the Adelante
authorization looks similar to that of the European Union in regulating
foreign financial conglomerates (requiring the establishment of an EUlevel subsidiary that could be walled off from the rest of the corporate
structure).129 While technically plausible, isolating the bank would require
close monitoring of its financial dealings with both Mexican and U.S.
affiliates, a concern partially addressed in the authorization’s reporting
requirements.130 But Mexico’s practical capacity to detect intra-group
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126
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financial maneuvers is untested, and recent IMF reports suggest that its
supervisory resources are strained. Sanctioning abuses may require
limiting services to the poor or shutting down the bank in an economic
downturn. This would take enormous political will and resources to pay
off the depositors, and may exacerbate the crisis.
It is also plausible that a large retail operation might act as a stabilizing
influence in the event of a financial or macroeconomic crisis: supermarkets
are less vulnerable than banks to financial shocks. Wal-Mart used the last
major crisis in Mexico to expand when others left.131 However, to the
extent Walmex stores continue to provide higher-end products rather than
basic necessities for most Mexicans who shop there,132 they may be more
susceptible in a downturn. Wal-Mart’s departures from Germany and
South Korea in 2006 suggest that withdrawal is a real option whose
benefits can outweigh the reputational harm to the franchise.133
Even absent a nefarious plot to exploit Mexico’s bank safety net for
the benefit of the commercial parent, or cross-border shell games made
famous by BCCI in the early 1990s,134 Wal-Mart’s sheer size and its
potential dominance in certain market segments135 (notably immigrant
remittances) could make the safety and soundness of its Mexican bank a
broader systemic concern. It is possible to envision a chain reaction from
the failure of a bank with access to dollar and peso payment systems and
handling large volumes of politically sensitive cross-border transfers. Such
a failure would have financial and political repercussions on both sides of
the U.S.-Mexican border. The existence of a U.S. counterpart could give
Mexican regulators an early warning of group-wide vulnerability, and vice
versa. On the other hand, such regulatory ties are yet to be tested in the
131
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case of foreign-owned financial conglomerates such as Banamex and
Bancomer, which were acquired after the last financial crisis.
Because Wal-Mart bank does not yet exist, let alone dominate, in
Mexico, these concerns are necessarily speculative. Whether Mexico can
effectively introduce new safeguards for an existing bank is an open
question.
Some indirect testimony to the challenge facing the Mexican
authorities comes from the United States. In separate reports, the Inspector
General of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (the investigative arm of Congress)
concluded that the FDIC has no capacity to exercise comprehensive
consolidated supervision over commercial firms that own FDIC-insured
industrial loan corporations (ILCs).136 These reports were issued against
the background of several prominent commercial firms, including WalMart, applying for FDIC insurance to open state-chartered deposit-taking
ILCs. Elsewhere in this volume, the most in-depth scholarly treatment to
date of Wal-Mart’s application concludes that allowing commercial firms
to open insured deposit institutions expands the bank safety net to
unregulated parent firms, and threatens to undermine confidence in the
ILCs with potential for broader contagion. The study argues that granting
broader oversight authority to the FDIC is undesirable because it lacks the
necessary expertise. It would expand government oversight of the
economy with uncertain payoff.137
U.S. arguments against bank-industry combinations could certainly
hold in Mexico, with its troubled history of bank-industry ties and
macroeconomic volatility adding a layer of risk. The question is whether
Mexico should have the scope to make a different choice despite the risks
to its own and, potentially, the international financial system. If danger to
the international system (including contagion from a crisis in Mexico) is
significant, more centralized regulation may be in order.
At this stage, Mexico would seem to bear most of the risks of WalMart’s bank. And Mexico made the decision to allow and even encourage
commercial firms to open banks long before the Walmex application. Its
dysfunctional banking context and the urgent need for competition and
inclusion may help justify the choice. Wal-Mart’s FDIC application is not
a perfect comparison, since the Mexican financial regulators have more
formal leeway to oversee and discipline Walmex (not Wal-Mart): their
136
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legal authority is broader, closer to that of the Federal Reserve Board than
the FDIC in the United States.138 The terms of Adelante’s license suggest
that the authorities’ strategy focuses on walling off the bank, rather than
extending oversight to the entire corporate group.139 The fact that
Mexican-owned retailers do not have such explicit conditions on their bank
licenses may indicate that regulators sought to separate Adelante in
response to its foreign ownership or its size more than its retail affiliation.
Rather than patch the “home-host hole”, Mexico decided to regulate
territorially.
Mechanically, patching the hole at the international level would be
straightforward. One approach might be to prohibit unregulated entities
from owning offshore banks. The argument might be that if Wal-Mart
cannot open a bank in the United States, it should not have one in Mexico.
This would produce regulatory centralization,140 expanding the territorial
reach of U.S. norms against combining banking and commerce.141 The
policy would help ensure that the “home” regulator has real authority over
the true management home, rather than formal authority over a banking
outlet, but would constrain establishment choices for international
conglomerates and emerging markets hosts.
On the other hand, patching the hole may come at a cost for the
emerging markets regulators. It would amount to ceding host country
authority where a foreign corporate parent is involved. This approach has
its own risks for the host. Home authorities regulate for their own sake;
home and host country interests can diverge with disparities in market size,
wealth and sophistication.142 For example, recent experience includes
138
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cases where the stringent credit standards (reasonably) introduced by the
home authorities at the parent level exacerbated credit contraction in a host
country crisis.143 Home country regulators may decline to address grouplevel credit and risk-management policies that disproportionately impact a
host country, but are insignificant for the group as a whole.
In sum, the home-host hole seems unavoidable where supervisory
harmonization proceeds in the context of regulatory diversity. It presents
risks both for the emerging markets host, and to a lesser extent for the
system. However, closing the hole in most cases would lead to
centralization of authority with dominant financial powers and loss of
autonomy for emerging markets regulators. The loss may be acceptable
where systemic risks are great, or where the host regulators have no
capacity to manage a foreign-dominated banking sector on their own.
Even so, it raises the question of when and how host countries might
develop such capacity, and the prospect of long-term regulatory
dependence.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the dust settles, Wal-Mart’s Mexican banking foray will likely
emerge as an important case study in financial globalization. The incident
suggests that the project of weaving a seamless supervisory blanket over
the global financial system may be fraught. The “home-host hole”—where
a supervisor has “home” responsibilities but “host” powers, as in the case
of a foreign bank established by an unregulated commercial parent—
presents special risks for countries whose financial systems are more
vulnerable to shocks and whose administrative capacity may be strained.
On the other hand, an international effort to patch the hole preemptively
would reduce the scope for regulation by the countries it seeks to protect.
At this writing, the story of Adelante could support three different
conclusions about transnational financial governance. First, it might be
read as a transitional moment in the steady march to regulatory and
countries). See also Jackson, supra note 140, at 16–21 (discussing attempts at global regulation of
financial institutions and how differences in national regulatory regimes may create competition among
nations).
143
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supervisory centralization: if Mexico’s bid to regulate the new bank as a
stand-alone entity fails, it might prompt a hole-patching exercise that
would favor home-country priorities, potentially at the expense of the host
country.
Second, the story could be about a triumph of private
“transnational financial structures” over national and public international
governance:144 a giant corporation looks poised to exploit cross-border
differences in substantive regulation and the resulting supervisory holes to
the detriment of weaker states. Third, Adelante could represent Mexico’s
claim to regulatory autonomy. Wal-Mart has conceded defeat in its latest
attempt to open a bank in the United States; some of the most powerful
arguments against it concerned the inability of U.S. financial regulators to
oversee banks embedded in commercial conglomerates.145 By licensing a
Wal-Mart bank, the Mexican authorities appear to reject the need to import
U.S. regulation and supervision, asserting instead their capacity to regulate
territorially. To be sure, their decision comes in the context of a
historically dysfunctional financial sector already dominated by large
foreign players, and is premised on a view of Wal-Mart as a force for
competition, at least in the near term.
Acknowledging the substantial risks for Mexico, this Article suggests
that the jury is still out on the import and implications of the home-host
hole—it is too early for policy prescriptions. At least in the case of WalMart’s bank in Mexico, the hole does not seem to present an immediate
threat to the international system. Patching the hole now for the sake of
Mexico’s financial stability may come at a cost of developing Mexico’s
regulatory capacity. The test will come in a crisis, when Mexico is called
upon to isolate and resolve the new banks owned by commercial firms,
which also serve vulnerable segments of the population. The regulatory
response will depend on how Wal-Mart fares relative to foreign financial
conglomerates and Mexican retailers, on any cross-border and systemic
effects from its presence, and on who pays the costs of the next crisis.
Until then, Mexico’s bid to regulate Wal-Mart’s bank may be a risk worth
taking.
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